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International Criminal Law
DERMOT GROOME AND JUDGE DONALD E. SHAVER*
International criminal law is undergoing a metamorphosis, steadily developing from an
indistinct amorphous body of generally recognized and "customarily accepted" legal
norms, to a distinct set of statutory laws and a constantly growing body of case law prece-
dents from an increasing number of international tribunals. This trend accelerated in
2007 with a number of important new decisions, including written decisions in the first
cases for the prosecution of leaders responsible for using child soldiers, one of the first
international criminal law cases to consider the right of the accused to discharge his ap-
pointed counsel, and the inauguration of the new Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
I. The International Criminal Court, Special Court for Sierra Leone, and
the Guantanamo Military Commission: Recent Case Law
Developments on the Offense of Conscripting or Enlisting Child
Soldiers
Over the past three decades, the use of child soldiers in combat has become increasingly
common. Although precise numbers are difficult to determine, Amnesty International
estimates that up to 300,000 child soldiers have been exploited in over thirty conflicts
around the world.' Children as young as ten years old are either voluntarily recruited into
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the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia from 2000 to 2005. In this capacity, Professor
Groome was responsible for the prosecution of several cases including the Bosnia indictment against
Slobodan Milogevic. The section on the recent case law pertaining to child soldiers was prepared by Judge
Donald Shaver, Presiding Judge of the Stanislaus Superior Court in Modesto, California. Judge Shaver
serves as a Vice Chair of the International Criminal Law Committee. He worked with the Trial Chamber of
the ICC as a "Visiting Professional" from April to August of 2006, on paid sabbatical sponsored by the
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1. Press Release, Amnesty International, Child Soldiers: A Global Issue, 1 5 (Sept. 8, 2007), available at
http://mediaforfreedom.com/ReadArticle.asp?ArticlelD=4474.
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the armed forces due to poverty or retaliation or abducted off the streets and out of
schools. 2
Until recently, the efforts to prevent this abuse have been mainly diplomatic, carried on
by various NGOs and the United Nations. In 2002, however, the Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Rights of Children, which implements a number of safeguards and
sets the minimum age for direct participation in hostilities at eighteen, came into force.3
In 2006, then U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan issued a report to the U.N. Security
Council, identifying violators and demanding demobilization. 4 That same year, to mark
the tenth anniversary of the landmark U.N. report by Graqa Machel, Impact of Armed
Conflict on Children, 5 the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children
and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, and UNICEF co-convened a strategic re-
view of the current situation faced by children in conflict situations. The report of that
strategic review was published in 2007.6
A new era in the struggle to prevent the recruitment and use of child soldiers occurred
in 2007. This year saw the first convictions for this offense by the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, and another major offender bound over for trial after a hearing by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. Also of interest is a pending case before the Guantanamo Military
Commission for the prosecution of a child soldier.
A. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is currently prosecuting Congolese warlord
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo for conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen
years and using them to participate actively in hostilities between September 2002 and
August 2003, 7 in violation of Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute. 8 A "confirmation
2. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, at 6-8, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. AIRES/54/263 (May 25, 2000).
3. Id.; see also UNICEF and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Guide to the Optional Protocol
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.unicef.org/publications/
files/option-protocol conflict.pdf. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers is an umbrella group of
NGOs which has worked closely with UNICEF on the issue.
4. The Secretary-General, Children and Armed Conflict, 11 1-3, delivered to the Security Council and the
GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/61/529-S/2006/826 (Oct. 26, 2006); see also Human Rights Watch, UN: Secur-
ity Council Must Punish Users of Child Soldiers, , 1, (Nov., 2006), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/
2006/11/27/global14664.htm.
5. The Secretary-General, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, 11, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1996).
6. The Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict, T 1, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/62/228 (Aug. 13, 2007).
7. Le Procureur v. Thomas Luhanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 9 9, (Jan. 29, 2007) [hereinafter
Lubanga Dyilo].
8. Article 8(2) (e)(vii) provides as follows:
For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means .... (e) other serious violations of the laws
and customs applicable in armed conflict not of an international character, within the established
framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts: .... (vii) Conscripting or
enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to
participate actively in hostilities.
International Criminal Court, ROME STATUTE, art. (8)(2)(e)(vii), A/CONF.183/9 (July 1, 2002) [hereinafter
ROME STATrUTE].
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hearing" was held from November 9 to November 28, 2006, and on January 29, 2007, the
Pretrial Chamber rendered its decision confirming the charges and committing the ac-
cused to the Trial Chamber. 9 The trial is scheduled to start June 23, 2008.
The case against Lubanga is the first war crimes trial that focuses exclusively on child
soldiers.' 0 The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict called the case a "major milestone in international attempts to eradicate the prac-
tice of using child soldiers."" The Chamber resolved a number of issues relating to the
prosecution of this type of offense. Their opinion was relied on by the Special Court for
Sierra Leone in rendering their judgment in the Brima case in June 12 and will undoubt-
edly influence judicial interpretations in future cases.
1. Mens Rea Issues
A number of issues were raised concerning the necessary mens rea required to commit
this offense.
a. Must the Accused have Actual Knowledge that this Practice was Considered a
Crime Under the Rome Statute and Customary International Law?
At the hearing, the defense argued that the recruiting and use of child soldiers had been
common in the region for some time and that neither Uganda nor the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo (DRC) took any steps to publicize the new prohibition in the Rome Statute
after its adoption in September of 2002.13 Therefore, it was not foreseeable by Lubanga
that the conduct would later be criminally punishable. 14 Moreover, the defense argued,
customary international law15 only prohibited the recruitment of children and did not
mention enlistment. Since Lubanga was being prosecuted for both recruitment and en-
listment under the Rome Statute, the defense argued that knowledge could not be im-
puted based on the customary international law in place at the time. 16
The Chamber rejected these arguments, finding that there was no need to establish
actual knowledge of the statute by Lubanga. Since the statute was clear and unambiguous
on its face, no further foreseeability was required under Article 32(2), which contains the
doctrine on "mistake of law."17 This holding follows the traditional common law rule that
ignorance of the law is no defense.
9. Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 7, at 9 156-57.
10. Press Release, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict, ICC's First Case is Milestone for Issue of Child Soldiers (Nov. 9, 2006) available at hnp://www.un.
org./children/conflict/pr/2006-11-09130.html.
11. Id. at 9 1.
12. See, e.g., Judgment, Prosecutor v. Brima, SCSL-2004-16-T, 1729 and note 1418 Gune 20, 2007) [here-
inafter Brima].
13. Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 7, at 9 296.
14. Id. at 294, 304.
15. Id.; Protocols Additional I and II to the Geneva Conventions, and the Optional Protocol to the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child.
16. Id. at 296.
17. Id. at 9 302, 305.
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In addition, the Chamber found that the Rome Statute did not intend to establish new
crimes simply because it included both recruitment and enlisting.' 8 The Geneva Conven-
tions and the two Additional Protocols of 1977 provide that children under the age of
fifteen are "protected persons" and the parties to conflicts must insure that they "do not
take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them
into their armed forces."' 19 In this context, the Chamber interpreted the provision to in-
clude both recruitment and enlisting.20
b. What is the Mental State Required to Commit the Offense?
Article 30 of the Rome Statute states that an accused may only be found criminally
liable if he committed the material elements of the offense with "intent and knowledge."21
Does this mean that the accused must have specifically intended or expressly discussed
with or directed subordinates to recruit underage children, or that he must have been
actually aware of the ages of each of the underage children? The Chamber resolved both
of these issues by answering "no."
In explaining this holding, the Chamber began with a discussion of principal and acces-
sory liability ("co-perpetration"). 22 The Chamber considered and rejected the objective
approach found in those systems, which hold that only an accessory who physically carries
out one or more of the elements of the offense may be equally liable with the principal.23
The Chamber next considered and rejected those systems used by entities such as the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and most U.S. jurisdic-
tions, which consider an accessory equally liable if he aided and abetted the commission of
the offense with the same intent, common plan, or purpose to commit the offense as the
principals, regardless of the extent of his contribution (subjective approach). 24
Instead, the Chamber adopted an approach that predicates accessory liability on control
over the crime.25 Under this approach, even those removed from the scene of the crime
may be found equally liable if they control or mastermind its commission because they
decide whether and how the offense will be committed.2 6 The Chamber held that this
approach best harmonized the various ways of finding accessory liability under Article
25(3) in light of the "residuary" liability provision in Article 25(3)(d), which provides for
accessory liability in cases involving contributions to the crime for the purpose of further-
18. Id. at 298.
19. Id. at 1 308.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1 350.
22. The Rome Statute provides for joint and several liability and provides that an accessory shall be equally
liable with a principle if he:
(b) [o]rders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is at-
tempted; (c) [facilitates,] ... aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission... ; (d) [or] [iln any
other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of
persons acting with a common purpose... made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity,
I . . [or with] the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.
RoME STATUTE, supra note 8, art. 25(3).
23. Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 7, at 91328.
24. Id. at 91329. In the U.S. system, this equates to specific intent.
25. Id. at 330.
26. Id.
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ing the criminal activity or with knowledge of the group's criminal intent, where such
contributions cannot otherwise be shown to be ordering, soliciting or inducing, facilitat-
ing, aiding or abetting, or assisting in the commission of the crime.
27
Closely related to the concept of required mental state is the concept of required
knowledge. The Chamber held that the war crime of conscripting and enlisting children
under the age of fifteen for combat is a general intent crime and does not require a specific
intent.28 But the elements do require that the "perpetrator knew or should have known
that such person or persons were under the age of 15 years."29 Does this mean that the
prosecution must prove that the accused actually knew which specific individuals were
underage or knew how many were underage? May the accused insulate himself from lia-
bility by intentionally remaining ignorant of the ages? Once again, the Chamber an-
swered both questions in the negative.
The Chamber focused on the phrase "should have known" and found that it falls within
the concept of negligence. 30 The Chamber held that if lack of knowledge resulted from a
failure to act with due diligence, the "should have known" element is satisfied. 31 The
Chamber found that this element is actually an exception to the general intent and knowl-
edge requirement contained in Article 30, since that general provision begins with the
phrase " [u]nless otherwise provided." 32
2. Actus Reus Issues
In addition to prohibiting the conscription or enlistment of children into armed forces,
the statute generally proscribes "using them to participate actively in hostilities." 33 The
Chamber further clarified what constitutes "using" children in hostilities.
The Chamber used as its starting point Article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Convention, which prohibits using minors in the gathering and transmission of
military information, transportation of arms and ammunition, or the provision of sup-
plies.34 To that list they added "combat related activities" mentioned in the ICC Prepara-
tory Committee report, such as scouting, spying, sabotage, and the use of children as
decoys, couriers, or at military check points.35 The Chamber next went to the Interna-
tional Red Cross's Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
27. Id. at T 337.
28. Id. at 357.
29. International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, 33, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 9, 2002). The elements are
listed as:
1. The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or more persons into the national armed forces or
used one or more persons to participate actively in hostilities. 2. Such person or persons were
under the age of 15 years. 3. The perpetrator knew or should have known that such person or
persons were under the age of 15 years. 4. The conduct took place in the context of and was
associated with an international armed conflict. 5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circum-
stances that established the existence of an armed conflict.
30. Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 7, at 358.
31. Id.
32. Id. at % 359.
33. ROME STATUTE, supra note 8, art. 8(2)(e)(vii).
34. Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 7, at 260.
35. Id. at % 261.
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Conventions of 12 August 1949 to add the use of children to guard military objectives,
military quarters, or as bodyguards to commanders. 36 But the Chamber specifically
pointed out that the prohibition did not apply to using children in food deliveries to an
airbase or as domestic staff in married officers' quarters. 37
The Chamber clarified other basic principles relating to the offense. The Chamber
held that "conscripting" and "enlisting," the terms used in the Rome Statute, are both
forms of "recruitment," the term's used in Article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I-the
distinction being that "conscripting" is forcible recruitment, and "enlisting" is voluntary
recruitment. 38 Thus, under customary international law and the Rome Statute, consent of
the child is not a defense to the offense. 39
The Chamber also determined that the crime is a continuing offense.40 The crime
continues to be committed as long as the child remains in the armed group or forces and
ceases upon the child leaving or reaching the age of fifteen.41 But the Chamber further
held that the Prosecution could elect to charge each instance of enlistment or recruitment
and each instance of use in hostilities as a separate offense under the statute.42
B. SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
On June 20, 2007, the Special Court for Sierra Leone handed down the first convictions
ever rendered by an international tribunal for the crime of recruiting and using child
soldiers in hostilities. 43 Human Rights Watch called it "a ground-breaking step toward
ending impunity for commanders who exploit hundreds of thousands of children as
soldiers in conflicts worldwide.""4 After a trial that lasted just over three years, 45 the
three defendants, Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu,
were convicted of eleven counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity,46 including
charges of conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen into armed forces or
groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities. 47 Brima and Kanu were sen-
tenced to fifty years each, and Kamara to forty five years. 48
36. Id. at 263.
37. Id. at 1 262.
38. Id. at 1 246.
39. Id. at 247.
40. Id. at T 248.
41. Id.
42. Id. at $ 321.
43. Brima, supra note 12.
44. Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: Landmark Convictions for Use of Child Soldiers, (June 20, 2007),
available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/06/20/sierra16214_txt.htm.
45. Brima, supra note 12, at TT 5-10.
46. Id. at 2112-23.
47. Id. at 2113, 2117, 2121 (citing STATUTE OF THE SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRA LEONE, art. 4(c),
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.html).
48. S Leone Militia Leaders Convicted, BBC NEws (Aug. 2, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6927
550.stm.
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1. Mens Rea Issues
The Sierra Leone Court was faced with many of the same issues that were raised in the
Lubanga case, and in most cases, their rulings were similar.
a. Did the Accused Have Adequate Notice that their Conduct Would be Punishable
as a Crime?
Unlike the Lubanga case, the accused were charged with violations that occurred before
the passage of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 49 Therefore, the prose-
cution was required to prove the defendants' conduct would be punishable under accepted
customary international law at the time and could not resort to the constructive notice
provision of the statute as the Lubanga court had been able to do. But defense counsel in
both cases made essentially the same arguments to the Court, which they characterized as
"Mistake of Law."50 The defense claimed that various governments of Sierra Leone also
recruited underage children during the period charged51 Indeed, a defense expert testi-
fied that, in the traditional African setting, the concept of childhood is more related to
ability to perform tasks, not chronological age, and that the use of children combatants
was a long standing practice in the decades prior and all factions resorted to using
children. 52
The argument, however, was no more successful in the Sierra Leone Court that it had
been in the International Criminal Court. "The rules of customary international law," the
Sierra Leone Court held, "are not contingent on domestic practice in one given coun-
try."53 Moreover, the Court held that the age limit of fifteen was fixed in customary
international law, and not flexible depending on the local culture.54
In finding that the practice was recognized as a crime under customary international
law, the Sierra Leone Court relied on the same documents that the ICC did-the 1949
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II.55 In addition, the Sierra Leone Court
found support for this proposition in the Convention of the Rights of the Child and the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.56
2. Actus Reus Issues
The Sierra Leone Court adopted many of the conclusions of the ICC on the important
actus reus characteristics of the offense. They found that the offense is committed by ei-
ther conscripting, enlisting, or using underage children in hostilities. 57 Additionally, the
court adopted the holding from Lubanga that the recruitment could be either forcible
49. The accused were charged with events occurring between May 1997 and January 2000 (Brima, supra
note 12, 16), and the Special Court was not established until August 14, 2000. (S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000)); Lubanga Dyila, slpra note 7, at 91 9.
50. Brima, supra note 12, at 1 730.
51. Id.
52. Id. at. 91 730, 1250.
53. Id. at T 732.
54. Id. at 1 731.
55. Id. at 91 728; Lubanga Dyda, supra note 7, at 1 296.
56. Brima, supra note 12, 1 728, n. 1416.
57. Id. at 9 733.
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(conscripting) or voluntary (enlistment), therefore consent of the minor was not a de-
fense. 58 Furthermore, the court adopted the holding from Lubanga that conscription re-
fers to action by nongovernmental armed groups as well as governmental groups.5 9
Moreover, the Court used the exact same passage from the ICC Preparatory Commit-
tee report that the Lubanga Court did to define "using" and "participate" in the identical
way.60 The Court generally defined "active participation" as "[a]ny labour or support that
gives effect to, or helps maintain, operations in a conflict." 61 The Court then added some
examples of its own to the list of prohibited activities to include: "carrying loads for the
fighting;" "finding and/or acquiring food, ammunition or equipment" (not just transport-
ing it); "making trails or finding routes" (whether or not it amounts to "scouting"); and
"acting as human shields." 62
C. GuANTANAmo MILITARY COMMISSION
The third case of interest in 2007 in this area involved the questions of whether and
how child soldiers should be prosecuted for serious war crimes or atrocities that they
commit. According to Jo Becker of Human Rights Watch, while domestic courts in East
Timor, Sudan, and the DRC have prosecuted child soldiers, no international tribunal has
ever done so,63 and the charters for the International Criminal Court and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone both specifically exclude prosecution of most minors.64 At the
start of 2007, however, the United States was poised to become the first major power to
commence such a trial.
United States v. Omar Ahmed Khadr, one of the cases pending before the Guantanamo
Military Commission, charges Khadr with murder, conspiracy, spying, and assisting al
Qaeda. 65 Khadr, a Canadian citizen, was captured on July 27, 2002, in Afghanistan after a
bloody fire fight with U.S. forces. 66 He was fifteen years old at the time. He is alleged to
have surprised U.S. soldiers clearing the rubble of a destroyed building by throwing a
grenade at them, killing one and wounding the another. 67 His trial was scheduled for
58. Id. at 1 735, n. 1431. The Lubanga decision acknowledged that this distinction was actually made
previously by Judge Robertson in his separate opinion appended to the judgment rendered by the Appeals
Chamber of the Special Court of Sierra Leone on May 31, 2004, in the case of Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga
Norman, so it may be a question of who is adopting whose opinion. Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 7, at 1 246.
59. Id. at 1 734 and n. 1429.
60. Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 7, at J 339.; Brima, supra note 12, at 9 1433.
61. Brima, supra note 12, at 737.
62. Id.
63. Accused's Age is Focus at Guantanamo Tribunal, (NPR radio broadcast June 4, 2007), available at http://
npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 10693462.
64. Article 26 of the Rome Statute, provides that the Court shall have no jurisdiction over minors who are
under eighteen at the time of the offense. ROME STATUTE, stpra note 8, art. 26. The Statue of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, Article 7, provides that the Court shall have no jurisdiction over minors under
fifteen, and for those between fifteen and eighteen, the Court must take into account the desirability of
"rehabilitation, reintegration into and assumption of a constructive role in society." STATUTE OF THE SPE-
ciAL COURT OF SIERRA LEONE, art. 7 (Aug. 14, 2000).
65. Trial Watch, Omar Ahmed Khadr, available at http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-watch/profile/db/legal-
procedures/omar-ahmed-khadr_455.htm!.
66. In Deptb: The Khadr Family, Omar Kbadr, CBC NEws (June 4, 2007), http://www.cbc.ca/news/back-
ground/khadr/omar-khadr.html.
67. Id.
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August 2007, and his lawyers were widely expected to test whether traditional duress de-
fenses would excuse crimes by child soldiers.
Amid growing controversy, however, his case was unexpectedly dismissed by a military
judge on June 4, 2007, based on a procedural flaw.68 The judge found that under the 2006
Military Commissions Act, the Commission only had jurisdiction to try "unlawful" enemy
combatants, not "lawful" combatants.69 But previous Combatant Status Review Tribunals
for Khadr and others had simply classified detainees as "enemy combatants" without dis-
tinguishing between lawful and unlawful.7 0 Thus the Commission did not have jurisdic-
tion to hear the case, and it was dismissed.71 A motion for reconsideration was denied
June 29, 2007.72
In September, the charges were reinstated after the government appealed the ruling to a
three judge panel of the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review. 73 The Court agreed
with the prosecution that the omission of the word "unlawful" was semantics and not
substantive and thus returned the case for trial. 74 No trial date has been set at this time.75
Khadr's lawyers have appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court.76 Khadr is now twenty one
years old and remains in custody.
II. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: Right of
the Accused to Discharge his Appointed Counsel
On May 9, 2007, the Appeals Chamber of the ITCY issued its judgment in Prosecutor v.
Blagojevic & Jokic. The Prosecution and both defendants appealed the Trial Chamber's
judgment. In its judgment, the Appeals Chamber dismissed the appeals of both Prosecu-
tion and the defendant Jokic. 77 With respect to Blagojevic, the Chamber vacated his con-
viction for complicity in genocide and upheld his conviction for other related crimes.78
The judgment is interesting not only because of its genocide ruling but also because the
Appeals Chamber examined whether a complete break-down of communication between
Blagojevic and his court-appointed lawyer warranted a new trial.
Vidoje Blagojevic was a former commander of the Bratunac Brigade of the Army of the
Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb Army)-one of the army units implicated in having a direct
68. Order on Jurisdiction, United States v. Khadr, (June 4, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mill
news/jun2007/khadrJudgesDismissalOrder(june%204).pdf.
69. Id. at 1 3, 4.
70. Omar Khadr Case Sparks debate over U.S. Terror Law, CBC Nrxw's (Aug. 24, 2007), http://www.cbc.ca/
world/story/2007/08/24/khadr.html?ref=rss.
71. Order on Jurisdiction, Khadr, supra note 68, at I 11.
72. Disposition of Prosecution Motion for Reconsideration P 001, Khadr, (June 29, 2007), available at http:/
/www.defenselink.mil/news/jun2007/KbadJudge%20Denies%2ORecon(june%2029).pdf.
73. Terrorism Charges Reinstated Against Khadr, CBC NFvs (CANADIAN BROADCASTVING CoMPANY) (Sept
24, 2007), http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2007/09/24/guantanamo-khadr.html.
74. Id.
75. William Glaberson, Decks are Stacked in War Crimes Cases, Lawyers Say, N.Y. TIMvs, Nov. 8, 2007, at
A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/09/washington/09gitmo.html.
76. Government to Oppose Khadr Appeal, SCOTUS Blog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/
government-to-oppose-khadr-appea (Oct. 17, 2007, 12:37 EST).
77. Judgment, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-A, 1 137 (May 9, 2007) [hereinafter
"Blagojevic Appeals Judgment"].
78. Id. at 137.
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role in the genocidal massacres that followed the takeover of Srebrenica in July 1995. The
Trial Chamber found him guilty of complicity in the Srebrenica massacres despite deter-
mining that he had no actual knowledge of the killings between July 12th and 14th at the
time his conduct contributed to them. 79
A. GENOCIDE
The key issue related to the genocide conviction was what reasonable inferences could
be drawn from the forcible transfer of Muslim refugees in Srebrenica and the subsequent
separation and mistreatment of military-aged men. While the Appeals Chamber acknowl-
edged that the transfers were relevant to determine whether the principal perpetrators
possessed the dolus specialis or special intent of genocide (the intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a protected group), it recalled its findings in the Krstic appeals judgment that
"forcible transfer does not constitute in and of itself a genocidal act," it is simply one of
several acts that should be considered in the context of all the circumstances to determine
the existence of genocidal intent.80 The Appeals Chamber rejected as unreasonable the
Trial Chamber's finding that the forcible transfers and subsequent mistreatment suffi-
ciently demonstrated that the principal perpetrators possessed genocidal intent.81
Similarly, when evaluating the prosecution's reliance on the opportunistic killings that
accompanied the more organized mass executions in Srebrenica, the Appeals Chamber
found that "'opportunistic killings' by their very nature provide a very limited basis for
inferring genocidal intent. Rather, as the Appeals Chamber determined in the Krstic Ap-
peal Judgment, these culpable acts simply assist in placing the mass killings in their proper
context."8 2 After acquitting Blagojevic of complicity in genocide, the Appeals Chamber
reduced his sentence from eighteen to fifteen years.
B. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Throughout the course of the trial, the relationship between Blagojevic and his court-
appointed counsel was marked by Blagojevic's animosity toward him and unwillingness to
cooperate in his own defense. The Appeals Chamber summarized the relationship as "a
complete breakdown in trust and communication, ultimately pervading the entire trial."8 3
In his appeal, Blagojevic alleged that the trial had been fundamentally unfair. He claimed
that the Tribunal's legal aid system denied him the right to retain a counsel of his choice.
He further claimed that his assigned counsel was incompetent, citing several criticisms
directed at the attorney by the Trial Chamber. Lastly, and perhaps most significantly,
Blagojevic asserted that the Chamber, by conditioning his testimony on the requirement
that his examination be conducted by his attorney, effectively denied him the right to
appear as a witness on his own behalf.84
79. Judgment, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case No. IT-02-60-A, 1 4-5 (Jan. 17, 2005) [hereinafter "Blagojevic
Trial Judgment"].
80. Judgment, Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, 9 33 (April 19, 2004).
81. Blagojevic Appeals Judgment, supra note 77, at 123.
82. Id. at 123.
83. 1d. at 12.
84. Id. at 26.
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The relationship between Blagojevic and his attorney rapidly and irreparably deterio-
rated soon after it began. According to Blagojevic, the demise of the lawyer/client rela-
tionship began when his attorney publicly accused him of requesting his counsel to
forward part of the defense budget provided by the Tribunal to people designated by
Blagojevic. s5 This issue has arisen in other cases and is referred to as "fee-splitting." In
some cases, the Tribunal's remuneration exceeds that traditionally paid to defense lawyers
in the former Yugoslavia. Some accused have been reported to require lawyers, as a condi-
tion of engagement, to remit a portion of their earnings to family members at home to
replace income lost because of their pre-trial detention in The Hague. In Blagojevic's
view, this accusation was tantamount to his own counsel accusing him of being a "com-
mon criminal" and destroyed the possibility that they could ever establish an effective
working relationship. 86
On the issue of his ability to select counsel, Blagojevic argued that even as a beneficiary
of the ICTY's legal assistance program, he had an absolute right to choose who repre-
sented him. The Appeals Chamber summarily dismissed this argument holding that "[a]n
accused who lacks the means to remunerate counsel shall have the right to have counsel
assigned to him by the Registrar from the list drawn up in accordance with Rule 45 (B)."87
The Chamber noted that while the practice of the Registrar was, when possible, to accom-
modate an accused's preference for a particular attorney from the list of qualified defense
counsel, such practice did not create an enforceable right but simply indicated the Regis-
trar's deference to the wishes of the accused when possible.ss
In this case, Blagojevic's initial choice of defense counsel was honored by the Registrar.
It was the Registrar's refusal to allow him to change attorneys that became the basis of this
appeal. The Appeals Chamber recalled its earlier decision on Blagojevic's interlocutory
appeal in which it held that, while Blagojevic and other indigent persons have the right to
counsel, such right did not include an absolute right to choose a specific person.8 9 The
Chamber then noted that once properly assigned, "counsel has a professional obligation to
continue representing the accused and may only be withdrawn or replaced, if sufficient
cause exists." 90
As the trial progressed, Blagojevic maintained his position that he would not communi-
cate with or instruct his attorney. He resisted the Trial Chamber's many efforts to restore
and facilitate communication between them. The Appeals Chamber recalled its decision
dismissing Blagojevic's interlocutory appeal, which held that the Trial Chamber's earlier
85. Id. at 1 18.
86. Id. at $1 17-19. With respect to the fee-splitting allegations made by defense counsel, the Appeals
Chamber recalled its earlier ruling that the matter had no bearing on the Trial Chamber's decision to deny a
change of counsel. In this interlocutory decision the Chamber dealt with the matter in detail in an attempt to
bring finality to the issue. The Appeals Chamber found that Blagojevic's defense counsel did not breach the
lawyer/client privilege by divulging the fee-splitting matter to the Chamber and in fact was ethically obliged
to notify the Registrar of the matter. The Chamber further found that the allegation of impropriety was not
directed at Blagojevic himself but was the result of "family pressures."
87. Id. at 17.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 18 (citing Public and Redacted Reasons for Decision on Appeal by Vidoje Blagojevic to Replace
His Defense Team, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case No. IT-02-60-AR73.4, 22, 23, 54 (Nov. 7, 2003)).
90. Blagojevic Appeals Judgment, supra note 77 at 17.
SUMMER 2008
410 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
decision to refuse Blagojevic's request to change counsel did not violate his right to a fair
trial and, given the complexity of the case, protected his right to an expeditious trial.91
Blagojevic also asserted that the poor relationship with his counsel and the fact that his
counsel conducted much of the defense without the benefit of instruction from him made
his representation ineffective. 92 The Appeals Chamber noted that attorneys selected by
the Registrar are presumed to be competent and such a presumption can only be rebutted
by establishing that counsel acted with "gross incompetence." 93 In support of his claim,
Blagojevic pointed to four examples which he believed demonstrated his counsel's incom-
petence. 94 These examples included his claim that his counsel mischaracterized the nature
of his military authority over a co-accused in the case, his selection of witnesses that
Blagojevic believed harmed his case, and two Trial Chamber decisions that criticized
counsel's performance.
The Appeals Chamber found that Blagojevic's own submissions on appeal revealed that
the continued poor relationship with his lawyer was due to his unilateral refusal to com-
municate with defense counsel. 95 The Trial and Appeals chambers both found that,
throughout the trial, defense counsel continued in his willingness to meet with the ac-
cused and to receive instructions. 96 The Appeals Chamber dismissed Blagojevic's claim
finding that any short-comings of counsel were due to Blagojevic's steadfast refusal to
communicate with him and not because of any inherent defect in his representation. 97
The discord between Blagojevic and his attorney reached its pinnacle when Blagojevic
notified the Trial Chamber that he wished to testify in his own defense. The Chamber
ruled that he could provide such testimony in one of two ways. He could give an unsworn
statement under the control of the Chamber as provided for in Rule 84 bis (this statement
would not be subject to cross-examination) or he could give evidence like other witnesses,
under oath, and via direct and cross-examination. The court reminded Blagojevic that he
could also elect to exercise his right to remain silent.98
Blagojevic, seeking to benefit from the greater weight the Chamber would place on
testimony taken by conventional methods, was willing to testify under oath and to subject
himself to cross-examination. He steadfastly refused to consult with his attorney in ad-
vance of his testimony and refused to permit his attorney to question him. The Trial
Chamber refused to accommodate Blagojevic's request to be allowed to give his direct
testimony, under oath, without being questioned by counsel. 99 Given the importance of
the matter, the Trial Chamber conducted a hearing to receive Blagojevic's decision and
interpreted his refusal to accept the court's conditions as a decision to exercise his right to
91. Id. 1I 14 (citing Public and Redacted Reasons for Decision on Appeal by Vidoje Blagojevic to Replace
His Defense Team, Prosecutor v. Blagjevic, Case No. IT-02-60-AR73.4, 1 50 (Nov. 7, 2003)).
92. Id. at T 15 (citing Blagojevic Appeal Brief, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case No. IT-02-60-A, 2.14-2.20,
2.23, 2.35, 2.37. 2.38. (May 9, 2007)).
93. Blagojevic Appeals Judgment, supra note 77 at 23.
94. Id. at 1 24.
95. Id. at 9 25.
96. Id. at 9 28.
97. Id. at 9 25.
98. Blagojevic Trial Judgment, supra note 79, at 9 907.
99. Id.
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remain silent.' 00 Blagojevic alleged on appeal that the options offered by the Trial Cham-
ber effectively denied him the right to testify.
The Appeals Chamber recalled the Galic Appeal Judgment in which a similar issue was
raised when the Trial Chamber placed some time limits on Galic's testimony. The Ap-
peals Chamber in Galic confirmed that while a defendant has a right to appear as a witness
in his own defense, that this right must be exercised within the Trial Chamber's authority
to control the conduct of the trial as long as the conditions imposed do not unreasonably
interfere with the defendant's opportunity to testify.101 The Appeals Chamber was of the
view that the Trial Chamber made every effort to facilitate Blagojevic's testimony and its
insistence that his testimony be the product of questioning by defense counsel was not an
unreasonable infringement of his right to testify. "It was Blagojevic's unjustified and uni-
lateral refusal to communicate with his assigned counsel that resulted in his failure to
testify, rather than any action or unjustified restriction imposed on his right by the Trial
Chamber." 102
Judge Shahabuddeen disagreed with this portion of the majority's holding, believing
that the poor relationship between Blagojevic and his attorney required a new trial.'03
According to the dissent, the record was clear that Blagojevic wanted to testify and was
willing to consult with an attorney but simply refused to meet with his assigned counsel
who he repeatedly sought to remove. According to Judge Shahabuddeen's analysis, the
Trial Chamber incorrectly paired Blagojevic's willingness to submit to cross-examination
with a requirement that his direct evidence be the product of questioning by an attorney
whom he did not wish to represent him. 10 4 The assistance of counsel during direct exami-
nation of a defendant is a right-a right which Blagojevic could knowingly, intelligently
and voluntarily waive. He was under no obligation to use counsel in order to exercise his
right to testify before the Chamber. He could waive his right to the assistance of counsel
during his direct evidence without waiving his fundamental right to testify. To do other-
wise would be to imprison him in the right.1°5 In Judge Shahabuddeen's view, the condi-
tions placed by the Trial Chamber on Blagojevic's testimony denied him the right to place
his account before the Trial Chamber and the resulting conviction, without the benefit of
his evidence, was fundamentally flawed and could only be remedied by granting the re-
quest for a new trial.'0 6
Ill. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: The Newest ad hoc Tribunal
On May 30, 2007, the U.N. Security Council once again exercised its authority under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to create an ad hoc international criminal tribunal. With
a vote of ten to zero (five members abstained), the Security Council passed Resolution
1757 to create an international tribunal to investigate and bring to justice perpetrators of
100. Blagojevic Appeals Judgment, supra note 77 at IT 28-29.
101. Id. at 9 27.
102. Id. at 28.
103. Id. at 1 10 (Shahabuddeen, M., dissenting in part).
104. Id. at 1 4.
105. Id. at 1 6 (citing Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269 (1942)).
106. Id. at 1 9.
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the February 14, 2004, assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. 10 7
The resolution creating the tribunal was sponsored by the United States, the United
Kingdom, Belgium, France, Italy, and Slovakia and broke a stalemate in the Lebanese
parliament over implementation of a U.N. brokered agreement to establish a tribunal that
was approved by the Security Council in November 2006. Five months of discussion in
the Lebanese parliament failed to persuade a pro-Syrian minority to withdraw their oppo-
sition to the agreement, effectively blocking its implementation. Because of the stalemate,
Lebanon's Prime Minister, Fouad Siniora, sent a letter to Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon asking him to place the matter before the Security Council to consider overcoming
the stalemate with a binding resolution to establish the tribunal. The Secretary-General,
concluding that all other diplomatic efforts had been exhausted, agreed to raise the matter
before the Council. °8
The Security Council's action was the culmination of the international community's
efforts to establish responsibility for the assassination. In April 2005, the Council estab-
lished the International Independent Investigation Commission led by Serge Brammertz,
the former deputy-prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. The Special Tribu-
nal's administrative structure mirrors that of the other ad hoc and special tribunals with
independent Chambers, an Office of the Prosecutor, Registry, and a Defence Office. The
Chambers consists of both Trial and Appeals chambers, with a Pre-Trial Judge assigned to
administer pre-trial matters. Each chamber is composed of both international and Leba-
nese judges with the Trial Chamber having one Lebanese and two international judges.
The Appeals Chamber has two Lebanese judges with the remaining three selected from
qualified international jurists.10 9
The cost of the tribunal is allocated between Lebanon, which pays 49 percent of the
tribunal's expenses, and the other member states that the remaining 51 percent of costs
through voluntary contributions. 110 The Netherlands agreed to host the tribunal in keep-
ing with its traditional role as the seat of other international criminal courts, including the
ICTY, the International Criminal Court, and the Charles Taylor case before the Special
Court for Sierra Leone.
Article 1 of the Statute establishes that the ratione materiae, or subject matter, of the
tribunal shall be crimes perpetrated in Lebanon between October 1, 2004, and December
12, 2005.111 This may be expanded by the parties to the original agreement if there are
other crimes of a similar nature and gravity as the attack that killed Hariri. 112 The Secur-
ity Council must approve any expansion of the Tribunal's mandate. 113 The Tribunal has
jurisdiction over other attacks having a nexus to the Hariri assassination. Factors that may
establish this nexus include: similarities between motive and purpose of the attacks, the
107. S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). China, Indonesia, Qatar, Russian Federation,
and South Africa abstained from voting on the resolution.
108. Id.
109. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establisbment of a Special Tribunal for Leba-
non, 25-26, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/893 (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://daccess
dds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/617/97/PDF/N0661797.pdrOpenElement.
110. Id. at 12.
111. Id. at 23.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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victims who are targeted, the modus operandi of the attacks, or any connections between
the perpetrators of the attacks. 114
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon differs from other ad boc criminal tribunals in that
the applicable substantive law is the criminal law of Lebanon.115 Article 2 of the Statute
provides that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate those portions of the:
Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the prosecution and punishment of acts of ter-
rorism, crimes and offences against life and personal integrity, illicit associations and
failure to report crimes and offences, including the rules regarding the material ele-
ments of a crime, criminal participation and conspiracy; and .. .Articles 6 and 7 of
the Lebanese law as of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the penalties for sedition, civil
war and interfaith struggle."' 16
In addition to the Article 2 reference to Lebanese law, Article 3 of the statute incorpo-
rates principles of accessorial liability from the statutes and jurisprudence of other interna-
tional criminal tribunals.' 17 "A person shall be individually responsible for crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal if that person: (a) [c]ommitted, participated as
accomplice, organized or directed others to commit the crime set forth in article 2 of this
Statute."" 8 Article 3 also provides for liability as a member of a joint criminal enterprise -
a form of liability having its genesis in the post-World War II war crimes cases and now a
common feature of international indictments." 9
Article 3 also outlines a form of command responsibility when crimes are "committed
by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her
failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates."', 20 This liability is invoked
whenever a superior "knew, or consciously disregarded information that clearly indicated"
that subordinates within the effective control of the superior were engaged in criminal
activity or when the superior failed to take all necessary measures to prevent or punish the
crimes.121
The Special Tribunal has concurrent jurisdiction with the national courts of Leba-
non.122 The national judicial authority in Lebanon is required to turn over its file and the
evidence it has gathered on the Hatiri case to the Tribunal. In the event of parallel cases,
the Tribunal has primacy and can remove cases from national courts. 123 The Statute voids
any amnesties that may be granted and empowers the tribunal to subsequently try a per-
114. Id.; see also id at 3.
115. Id. at 5-6.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 23-24.
118. Id.
119. Id. (stating:
A person shall be individually responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribu-
nal if that person... [clontributed in any other way to the commission of the crime set forth in
article 2 of this Statute by a group of persons acting with a common purpose, where such contri-
bution is intentional and is either made with the aim of furthering the general criminal activity or
purpose of the group or in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.)
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 24-25.
123. Id.
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son who has already been the subject of domestic criminal proceedings if the tribunal
determines that the proceedings were not impartial or that the case was not "diligently
prosecuted."124
The statute enumerates the rights of suspects and those formally accused of crimes.
Rights at the investigatory stage include the right to remain silent, the right to legal repre-
sentation, and the right to the services of an interpreter.' 25 Once formally accused, a
defendant is protected by the presumption of innocence and has the right to be adequately
informed of the charges against him as well as the right to examine the evidence against
him and present evidence on his behalf.' 26 The Statute requires judges to issue a written
judgment that can be appealed and empowers them to impose sentences up to life impris-
onment. There is no death penalty.1 27 The Statute also affords victims the right to ex-
press their views to the Special Tribunal to the extent such is not inconsistent with the
rights of the accused. 128
Notably, the Statute allows for trials in absentia in three cases: where the accused has
expressly waived his or her right to be present; where the accused has not been handed
over to the Tribunal by the State authorities concerned; or where the accused " [h]as
absconded or otherwise cannot be found and all reasonable steps have been taken to se-
cure his or her appearance before the Tribunal and to inform him or her of the charges" in
the indictment. 29 This last provision is apparently in response to the intractable problem
that General Radko Mladic and Radovan Karadii6 have proven to be for the ICTY, whose
statute does not permit trials in absentia.130 In the event that the tribunal proceeds without
the accused being present, the statute requires that the Defence Office of the Tribunal
appoint an attorney to represent the interests and rights of the accused.' 3'
124. Id.
125. Id. at 28.
126. Id. at 28-29.
127. Id. at 31 (requiring a "reasoned opinion in writing").
128. Id. at 29.
129. Id. at 31.
130. STATUTE OF THE L\TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, art. 2 1(4)(d)
(last amended Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legadoc-e/basicstatut/statute-febO6-e.pdf
131. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a SpecialTtribunal for Lebanon, supra note 109, at 31.
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